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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the progressive introduction of accommodation taxes in many European cities, there 
is no consensus in the literature as to whether they have positive or negative effects. This may 
be related to the lack of estimates of the elasticity of visitor demand to accommodation taxes. 
To fill this gap, we carry out two panel-data regressions using a dataset of airline travelers 
from UK cities to Spanish, French, and Italian destinations between 2012 and 2018. The 
results from the two-stage least squares regressions indicate that UK international travelers 
are indeed sensitive to hotel taxes. However, the impact of these taxes differs between peak 
and off-peak periods and across destination countries, with French destinations showing the 
most negative effect on visitor flows. The analysis of tax elasticities at a destination level also 
reveals the lack of a significant negative impact on visitor flows to major cities like Venice or 
Barcelona. 
Keywords: Tourist taxes; accommodation taxes; international travel; demand elasticities; 
panel-data regression. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Before the 1960s, there were no tourism-specific taxes. However, after the strong 
development of this sector during the last 50 years, there are now approximately 40 types of 
taxes levied on tourism (WTO 1998). According to the World Tourism Organization, 
countries that are highly dependent on tourism can generate up to 50% of their total revenue 
from this source. Tourist taxes can be implemented in two ways: 1) directly on the tourists or 
tourism businesses, and 2) on complementary sectors, such as travel and accommodation. 
Gago et al. (2009) discuss four key rationale for taxing tourism: the opportunity for 
significant revenue, lowering the fiscal burden on local residents, the tax acting as a price 
substitute for the goods and services that tourists consume, and, lastly, to correct negative 
externalities, such as the strain on the destination’s natural resources, public transport and 
general infrastructure. Taxes help mitigate negative externalities by reducing demand or 
generating revenue that can be invested in environmental preservation initiatives (Sheng 
2017).  
Most publications on tourist taxes focus on estimating the impact on tourism demand and 
social welfare. Corthay and Loeprick (2010) noted that the strong competition among 
destinations brings with it a significant price elasticity of demand. This should make the 
industry sensitive to taxes, which can erode the competitiveness of a destination (Durbarry 
2008) for both international and domestic visitors (who are also taxed). Despite that, looking 
at the 20 most visited cities in Europe, we find that approximately 75% of them have some 
sort of tax levied on tourism (Europarl.europa.eu 2017; Etoa.org 2019; Rhodes and Tyler 
2019). In spite of their popularity, there is no clear consensus in the literature as to whether 
tourism taxes have positive or negative effects. This might be attributed to the fact that there 
is such a wide range of tourist taxes, which can also be implemented differently and, 
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therefore, have varying impacts across different destinations. Biagi et al. (2017) also notes the 
scarcity of publications about the impact of taxes on visitor flows. Furthermore, the available 
studies, which typically employ computable general equilibrium (CGE) methods (e.g. Dwyer 
et al. 2012a; and Ihalanayake, 2012), rely on assumed price elasticities of tourism demand to 
determine the impact of tourism taxes. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
available estimates of accommodation tax elasticities. This is the main research gap we aim 
to cover. We argue that it is a significant contribution since it allows us to provide a specific 
assessment of the impact of taxes on visitor demand, which may be different from the impact 
of other visitor living costs bundled within the general price elasticity.   
To that end, we carry out two panel-data regressions (for peak and off-peak periods) using a 
dataset of airline travelers from cities in the United Kingdom to Spanish, French, and Italian 
destinations (both with and without tourism taxes) between 2012 and 2018. The value of the 
daily accommodation tax for 3-star hotels is used as a proxy for overall tourism taxes in each 
destination. The results from the two-stage least squares regressions indicate that UK 
international travelers are indeed sensitive to hotel taxes, which have a significant negative 
impact on visitor flows during the peak summer periods. The same strong negative impact 
was not found during off-peak winter periods. Furthermore, the impact of the taxes differs 
across destination countries, with French destinations being the most affected. The analysis of 
tax elasticities at a destination level also reveals the lack of a significant negative impact on 
visitor flows to major cities like Venice or Barcelona. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on 
the impact of tourism taxation on travel demand. Section 3 presents the UK case study, 
explains the process of data collection, and the panel data regression approach. Section 4 
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presents the results and discusses their main implications. Section 5 concludes with a 
summary of the main findings. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Since the introduction of tourism taxes in the 20th century, there has been an increasing 
amount of research on the subject. The earliest research on the implications and impact of 
tourism taxes is mostly focused on the US. However, in the last 20 years, many studies 
concerning European countries have been published.  
The over-exploitation of public resources involved in tourism activity to the point of 
congestion can reduce the value of a destination (Lukashina et al. 1996) and threaten the 
long-term sustainability of tourism-related economic activity (Hernández-Martín et al. 2015). 
One way to tackle congestion is to reduce visitor numbers with the introduction of tourism 
taxes (so visitors can internalize the congestion externality). These taxes generate revenues 
that can be invested in the preservation of local tourism resources (Palmer and Riera, 2003).  
The positive and negative aspects of tourism taxes are well established, though the literature 
is far from consensus on which effect dominates. On one hand, tourist taxes shift the burden 
of the tax away from locals, making it a more efficient source of revenue, since the tourists 
are made to bear the welfare loss associated with taxes (Gooroochurn and Sinclair 2005). The 
additional environmental benefits of “eco-taxes” in tourism areas are noted by Gossling et al. 
(2005), despite the possibility of taxes leading to increased prices for locals in goods such as 
fuel. On the other hand, the seminal paper of Mak and Nishimura (1979) argues that the 
relatively high price sensitivity of visitors implies that tourist taxes can have a negative 
impact on demand and revenues (also noted by Durbarry 2008). This was confirmed by Do 
Valle et al. (2012) who found that the typical sun-and-beach tourist (a dominant segment of 
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demand in many destinations) is not willing to pay accommodation taxes and only the smaller 
segments of environmentally-conscious and nature-oriented tourists are receptive to taxation. 
Sheng and Tsui (2009) stated that the impact of tourism taxes on social welfare depends on 
the market power of the given destination (which can mitigate the price elasticity effect), and 
that they are more likely to be welfare-enhancing when considered in a broader social context 
(thus adding the environmental benefits). Bird (1992) also argues for the imposition of tourist 
taxes in developing countries, where tourism may be one of the fastest-growing sectors. 
These views stand in contrast to Clarke and Ng (1993), Dwyer et al. (2012a), and Ihalanayake 
(2012) who concluded that taxes have a negative impact on welfare and GDP, but that 
governments implement them because they are easy sources of income. Overall, the 
aggregation of these points creates an interesting paradox, since a tax can reduce 
competitiveness if the destination does not have enough market power, yet the revenue 
generated from a tax can increase competitiveness and market power if invested effectively, 
e.g. in environmental protection or quality improvements (Litvin et al. 2006).  
Biagi et al. (2017) pointed out that, even though there have been many publications 
discussing tourism taxes since the 1970s, there is a scarcity of studies that estimate the impact 
on visitor flows. Most studies have focused on indirect tourism taxes such as carbon taxes or 
departure taxes on air travel. For example, Tol (2007) estimated the impact that carbon taxes 
on aviation would have on international travel demand. The author concluded that any 
decrease in long- and short-haul flights would be offset by an increase in medium-haul 
flights. Therefore, the overall demand will not be significantly affected. Dwyer et al. (2012b), 
on the other hand, concluded that carbon taxes in Australia would lead to a “small but 
significant” contraction of most tourism-related industries, particularly in the 
accommodation, transport, and catering sectors.  Turning their attention to airline departure 
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taxes, Forsyth et al. (2014) confirmed the negative impact on Australian tourism but also a 
positive impact overall on the Australian economy due to the tax working as a transfer of 
income from tourism to other sectors. Looking at taxes for departing flights in Germany and 
Austria, Falk and Hagsten (2019) found a 9% reduction in departures in the first year of 
implementation and 5% in the next. They highlight that the airports that are dominated by 
low-cost airlines carry most of this reduction, suggesting that consumers of these airlines are 
more price-elastic. Seetaram et al. (2013) concluded that the UK airport passenger departure 
tax only has a slight negative effect on demand in approximately half of the international 
destinations, whereas the demand is inelastic concerning the other half. We can also mention 
Durbarry (2008), who concluded that, in a context of strong price elasticity, UK passenger 
departure taxes will affect outbound tourism demand negatively. 
There is another body of literature that focuses specifically on accommodation taxes and 
clearly documented the sensitivity of hotel guests to these surcharges. We can mention the 
early contributions by Mak and Nishimura (1979) or Hiemstra and Ismail (1992) who both 
argued about the negative impact of taxation on hotel occupancy rates in the US. More 
recently, Lee (2014) concluded that hotels with bed taxes experience some degree of 
competitive disadvantage due to high substitutability with hotels in close regions that did not 
charge a tax. When evaluating the impact on visitor numbers at a city or regional level, there 
are a few studies about the Balearic Islands (Spain), which is a very strongly seasonal 
destination that is prone to congestion during the summer months. Aguiló et al. (2005) 
concluded that a tax of €1 per tourist per day would lead to a decrease in annual visitor 
arrivals of 117 thousand to the region. This value was calculated from estimated price 
elasticities of tourism demand (including relative prices and exchange rates) but did not 
employ tax data since the study was carried out before the implementation. Palmer and Riera 
(2003), on the other hand, concluded the opposite. They expected the impact of tourism taxes 
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to be low in the Balearics due to low price elasticities. Rosselló and Sansó (2017), with a 
post-implementation study, concluded that the current tax led to a decrease in tourist stays in 
the Balearics of 0.4% to 0.8%. Again, this estimate is based on assumed price elasticities of 
demand. This paucity of studies indicates that there is room for more contributions, 
particularly if they are carried out post-implementation using data on the actual taxes. 
Moreover, none of the studies above estimated the elasticity of demand to accommodation 
taxes but, instead, relied on estimates of the overall price elasticities of tourism demand, 
which bundles different components of the tourists’ living costs. We find this to be a 
weakness in the assessment of the specific impact of accommodation taxes on visitor 
numbers. 
The use of assumed price elasticities to approximate the economic impact of tourism taxes is 
very common in the literature. From a methodological perspective, the majority research is 
grounded in neoclassical economics (Song et al. 2012), which explains the popularity of 
demand analyses made via computable general equilibrium methods (CGE). GCE is 
commonly used to model the behavior of multiple markets simultaneously in the presence of 
external shocks. CGE methods are an efficient way to explore and study the impact of 
taxation on tourism (See e.g. Gooroochurn and Sinclair 2005, Sheng 2011, Ihalanayake 2012, 
Ponjan and Thirawat 2016), though they do not allow researchers to obtain a formal 
expression of demand from which to derive demand elasticities. On the contrary, the 
econometric estimation of demand functions allows for elasticities to be calculated and has 
become increasingly popular in tourism research over the last decades (Durbarry 2008). This 
is the approach we employ in this paper. 
The most common dependent variable is tourist arrivals, typically proxied by inbound air 
passengers (Durbarry 2008; Morley et al. 2014) if the origin or destination regions are 
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geographically isolated (i.e. islands). Alternatively, past authors have used tourist 
expenditures, overnight stays, length of stay (Rosselló and Sansó 2017) or the overall revenue 
of the tourism sector (Song and Li 2008). Income is the most common explanatory variable, 
typically proxied by a measure of GDP per capita for either or both origin and destination 
countries (Song et al. 2012). There is a broad consensus about the fact that international 
tourism is a normal good (i.e. positively linked to income) and income-elastic, which makes 
it a luxury good (Morley 1992; Crouch 1994). It is also important to account for the visitors’ 
travel and living costs. The use of Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) for the destination (possibly 
specific to accommodation and catering services) is the established approach in combination, 
if relevant, with exchange rate fluctuations (Martin and Witt 1987). Crouch (1992) also 
recommends adjusting destination prices with origin prices to obtain a measure of relative 
prices that is more representative of the information that outbound tourists will be taken into 
consideration when deciding to travel abroad. In the absence of detailed price information for 
a diverse set of origin and destination countries, there are publications that simply use 
exchange rates as a proxy for living costs (Su and Lin 2014) and jet fuel prices as a driver of 
airfares (Wadud 2015). Still, there is no separation between accommodation taxes and other 
elements of travel and living costs in past econometric approaches to estimate tourism 
demand. 
Regarding tourism taxes, past contributions have looked at different types of taxes, which 
include: Air Passenger Duty (APD) (Seetaram et al. 2013; Falk and Hagsten 2019), value 
added taxes (VAT) (Jensen and Wanhill 2002) and accommodation taxes (Mak and 
Nishimura 1979; Rosselló and Sansó 2017; Aguiló et al. 2003). We focus on the latter, while 
adopting past authors’ approach of collecting data on tax amounts per person and night, as it 
is the type of direct tourist tax that has received the most attention in the general press over 
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the last decade and, in addition, it is a tax that most outbound UK travelers cannot avoid 
paying when traveling to popular European destinations. 
Despite using established variables and empirical approaches, by separating accommodation 
taxes from other components of tourists’ travel costs in an econometric specification, we aim 
to estimate the tax elasticities of demand directly. This is a novel approach to determine the 
impact of accommodation taxes on visitor numbers and represents the main contribution of 
this paper.  
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Case study 
We study the impact of tourist taxes on the UK outbound travel demand between 2012 and 
2018. The destinations analyzed are the three major European ones for UK international 
travelers: France, Italy, and Spain (Rhodes and Tyler 2019). As it is common in the literature 
on tourism demand, the number of outbound airline passengers will be used as a proxy of the 
overall demand for outbound travel. Since our dataset (Official Airline Guide - OAG) 
provides information on both country-of-sale of the airline tickets as well as their booking 
class, we restrict our dependent variable to include only tickets sold in the UK and traveling 
on economy class, in order to better approximate the number of outbound UK travelers that 
would be most sensitive to accommodation taxes. Since the unit of observation is defined at a 
city level (in order to match our data on accommodation taxes) and with semi-annual 
frequency, the airline traffic data (from the UK to the three selected countries) have been 
aggregated for all airports in the same city. Two time periods are defined: the “Summer” 
period comprises from May to October and represents “peak” demand, while the “Winter” 
period covers from November to April and represents “off-peak” demand. The data include 
both direct (i.e. non-stop) and indirect air travel itineraries, which allows us to uncover 
additional places of origin for airline passengers who may depart from cities that do not have 
international airports. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which provides an overview of 
our sample. Air travelers depart from 38 cities in the UK and arrive in 129 destination cities 
across France (56), Italy (33), and Spain (40).  
Despite the plethora of destinations, there is a clear concentration of travelers around popular 
places. This information is expanded in Table 1, which shows the top-ten origin and 
destination cities in all sample countries, as well as the respective 3-star accommodation 
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taxes per person/night during the Summer of 2017. London dominates originating travel from 
the UK, followed by Manchester and Birmingham, which is not surprising given the high 
population of these cities as well as the size of their respective airports. Overall, Spain is the 
most popular destination among the selected ones, with 8.47 million passengers in 2017 
(61.8% of the total traffic). One reason for this popularity is the diversity of destinations 
available, with the capital and most populated city (Madrid) in seventh place, surpassed by 
coastal destinations in the Mediterranean (e.g. Alicante, Málaga, Barcelona) as well as in the 
Canary Islands. With more evenly distributed traffic shares across cities, the Spanish market 
has a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) of 949. In France (2.25 million travelers and 16.4% 
of traffic), Paris is the main destination followed by Nice, which is the main gateway to the 
tourist hotspots in the Mediterranean Coast. The traffic share of other French destinations 
decreases quickly, leading to a more concentrated market (HHI of 1,202). The Italian market 
(2.96 million travelers and 21.6% of traffic) is even more concentrated around Milan, Rome, 
and Venice, with an HHI of 1,432. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
[Insert Table 1] 
Figure 1 also reveals that the three destination countries have different approaches to tourism 
taxation: 1) France has a widespread coverage, with taxes present for all destinations and 
years in the sample. 2) Italy has taxes in most major destinations, all of which received 88% 
of the UK visitors (in 2017). The values differ across destinations, with Catania or Genoa 
having smaller taxes than Rome or Venice. 3) Accommodation taxes are only present in two 
regions in Spain: Catalonia (including the main airport in Barcelona and the secondary entry 
points in Girona and Reus) and the Balearic Islands (Mallorca, Menorca and Ibiza), all of 
which received 35% of the UK traffic to Spain. The taxes had been introduced (or were 
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already in place) by Summer 2012. The tax amounts for Girona and Reus are lower than the 
Barcelona ones but, since there is a substantial proportion of travelers to these secondary 
airports that stay in Barcelona, these cities are given the Barcelona tax values for the 
determination of tax elasticities. The Balearics doubled the amount in 2017.  
Besides the city taxes, it is worth nothing how major events, such as the Brexit vote in June 
2016, may have had an impact on UK outbound tourism demand. Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the annual change in international air passengers from the UK to the three 
selected countries against the changes in national income per capita and exchange rate (in 
euros per pound). We clearly see that the outbound UK travel market was showing clear signs 
of stagnation between 2012 and 2015, but, from 2016 onwards, has shown higher rates of 
growth despite the negative economic environment (with a greatly devaluated pound and 
reduced income per capita). This seemingly irrational behavior after a market shock 
(particularly in view of the high income elasticity traditionally associated to tourism demand) 
justifies the use of advanced statistical methods to disentangle the impact of city taxes (as a 
separate component of living costs) on outbound travel demand in the UK. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
3.2 Panel-data regression 
An unbalanced panel dataset of 13,071 observations was obtained. This includes a cross-
section of 1,867 origin-destination airport pairs over 12 semi-annual time periods, from 
Summer 2012 (May 2012 to October 2012) to Winter 2017 (November 2017 to April 2018). 
We argue that the use of panel data is justified since the tax amounts change over time and 
we combine destination cities with and without hotel taxes. Thus, there is variability in both 
cross-section and time-series dimensions in our data, which is beneficial for our research 
aims. Still, origin-destination markets with zero traffic were removed. In order to facilitate 
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the interpretation of some of the coefficients as demand elasticities, a double-log / log-linear 
specification was employed (with variables that take zero values left unlogged). Our basic 
model is shown in Equation 1: 
(1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑥𝑈𝐾𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙 𝑛(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽3𝑙 𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑙 𝑛(𝑗𝑒𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑖,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where i=(1,…,1867) denotes an origin-destination city pair and t=(1,…,12) refers to the time 
period. The usual random error is denoted by ε, and β refers to the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated. Finally, 𝑢𝑖 denotes the error disturbance which, in panel data, is disentangled into 
an unobservable individual specific effect (𝑣𝑖) and the rest of the disturbance (𝜀𝑖,𝑡). The 
existence of such individual heterogeneity is captured by the fixed-effects regression 
approach. The dependent variable (econpaxUKit) is defined as the number of arriving 
economy airline passengers in the i-th origin-destination city pair in year t, sourced from 
Official Airline Guide (OAG). In order to deliver a more detailed analysis, two specifications 
will be estimated, one for summer “peak” periods and a second one for winter “off-peak” 
periods. 
While there is not a clear consensus in the literature about the drivers of demand for tourism, 
there are however some factors that have always been considered by past studies, which are 
income and price levels (Crouch 1994). We include the origin income (gdporigin), measured 
as GDP per capita at the NUTS2 area (we use the European Union’s Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics) where the origin city is located. This coefficient is expected to 
be positive, according to the past literature, since tourism demand is widely accepted to be a 
normal/luxury good (Peng et al. 2014). 
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The role of “price” is included in the model in two ways: first, the visitors’ travel costs are 
proxied by the average jet fuel prices over the respective period (jetfuel), sourced from the 
US Energy Information Administration and, secondly, the visitor’s living costs (pricedest) 
are proxied by the destination city’s GDP per capita multiplied by the exchange rate 
measured at the end of each period. The logic is that living costs (not only accommodation 
but also catering and transportation) will be more expensive in richer regions and cities. 
While the literature recommends using consumer price indexes for the destination, possibly 
adjusted by the origin prices (Crouch 1992), there is not a consistent source of data available 
at a city- or NUTS2-level for the three sample countries. Historical hotel rate data were not 
available either for the sample period. We collected information on Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) exchange rates at a NUTS2 level, which can serve as proxies for regional price 
indexes. However, these indexes ended up being strongly correlated with the regional 
incomes. In support of using an exchange rate adjustment to obtain a traditional price-demand 
relationship, we can mention the lack of endogeneity problems, which are common when 
estimating tourism demand functions for destinations that are highly dependent on tourism 
(as many cities in the Mediterranean coast are) and for which the assumption of a perfectly 
price-inelastic tourism supply is not tenable (Crouch 1992). 
Tourist taxes (tax) are measured as the accommodation tax per person/night in a 3-star hotel 
for each year in the sample, and they have been collected mainly from online sources 
(Taxesejour.impots.gouv.fr 2019; Grouptravel-europe.com 2019; Italyvacations.com 2019; 
Fernández 2019; Roselló and Sansó 2017). The amount of hotel taxes to be paid is explicitly 
shown to customers of major online platforms (such as hotels.com or booking.com) at the 
time of booking. Hence, we assume that travelers are informed of the existence of these taxes 
and thus, they can have an impact on travel choices. According to the results from past 
studies, a negative coefficient can be expected since tourism demand is negatively affected by 
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trip costs (Roselló and Sansó 2017). An interaction between the tax coefficient and a dummy 
variable for the arrival country was added to the specification in order to obtain disaggregated 
results. For the discussion section, the tax coefficient was further subdivided in order to 
obtain city-specific tax elasticity estimates. 
Due to the UK’s insular nature, the quality of air connectivity can be considered a key driver 
of the number of outbound international visitors to a given destination. The proportion of 
non-stop airline frequencies in each market (pnonstop) is the chosen metric for that factor. 
The potentially endogenous relationship between air connectivity and international visitors is 
addressed by employing two instruments at a city-pair level: the share of low-cost bookings 
(slcc) and the market concentration, measured as the sum of the airlines’ squared market 
shares, which is known as the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (hhi). The low-cost instrument 
refers to the well-established notion that low-cost operators only sell non-stop connections, as 
opposed to full-service carriers that may offer indirect airline itineraries via their hub-and-
spoke networks (Dobruszkes 2013). A market that is more competitive (i.e. with a lower 
HHI) will pressure the airlines to offer non-stop connections to capture a higher market share. 
All these air traffic variables were sourced from OAG.  
The specification is completed with a set of dummy variables for each sample year to capture 
time-trend effects and other demand shocks, such as those linked to the Brexit vote discussed 
in the previous section.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the chosen variables for the summer and winter 
subsamples. The large variability in market sizes (shown by the passenger variable) suggests 
that our specification is likely to present heteroskedasticity and, thus, we employ robust 
standard errors in the econometric regression. Table 3 shows the pairwise linear correlation 
coefficient among the right-hand-side variables, which allows us to discard any issues with 
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multicollinearity, as well as to confirm that the low-cost instrument is strongly correlated 
with the non-stop connectivity factor.   
The Breusch-Pagan multiplier test supports the use of a panel-data vs the pooled approach 
with 1% significance. The Sargan-Hansen test concludes that an endogenous relationship 
exists between econpaxUK and pnonstop with 1% significance, thus supporting the use of a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method. The results of a Hausman test recommend 
that the estimation is carried out under a fixed-effects framework in order to account for the 
influence of non-observable factors, such as different levels of destination loyalty, possibly as 
a consequence of migration flows under the freedom-of-movement provisions of EU treaties. 
Finally, a White test does not reject the presence of heteroskedasticity at 1% significance, 
which means that we will estimate the model with robust standard errors.   
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results from the 2SLS regressions (shown in Table 4) indicate that UK international air 
travelers are slightly price-inelastic during the peak summer period and slightly elastic during 
winter. These results agree with the long-run price elasticity of British visitors to Spain from 
Álvarez-Díaz et al. (2015), as well as with the inelastic estimate from Garín (2011), 
respectively. The impact of jet fuel prices on visitor flows is not significant at 5% level in 
either model. As expected, the quality of non-stop air connectivity has a positive and 
significant on impact on visitor flows, regardless of season. Our UK income coefficients 
(around 0.53 in both models) disagree with the traditional view that international travel is a 
luxury good (Crouch 1992), and agree with the recently documented trend of decreasing 
income elasticities due to an ongoing saturation process (Gunter and Smeral 2016) and the 
impact of the economic recession during the last decade (Smeral 2017).  
The values of the year dummies are consistent with the main trends shown in Figure 2, where 
the UK outbound traffic increased, in a counterintuitive way, during 2016 and 2017. We 
explain these increases to the alarmist views expressed (at the time) by the airline companies 
(BBC 2016) about the Brexit process taking the UK out of the EU single market. This can 
have troubling consequences for major carriers that, at the time, claimed that they would not 
enjoy the necessary traffic rights to continue their operation of routes between the UK and the 
EU. The existence of potential market restrictions in the horizon may have boosted outbound 
travel demand between the UK and Spain, France and Italy, particularly during the peak 
summer periods. 
[Insert Table 4] 
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Regarding the impact of accommodation taxes, our model concludes that, during the peak 
summer period, both French and Spanish cities are, overall, negatively affected (the tax 
coefficients are significant at 5% level), while the impact on Italian destinations is not 
significant. On a per-euro basis (i.e. looking at the log-linear estimated coefficient), the 
percentage impact is higher in France than in Spain. During the off-peak period, only French 
destinations present a significant and negative impact on visitor flows. The impact on Spanish 
destinations is consistent with a reduced differentiation in the tourism product among Spanish 
cities, most of which target the sun-and-beach segment and thus, they experience a higher 
degree of substitutability among them. Italian destinations, which do not have such a strong 
focus in that type of tourism (note the non-coastal nature of many top destinations), enjoy a 
higher degree of market power that could make their visitor flows more resilient to a rise in 
travel costs. In relation to France, we link the significance of the negative impact to the more 
widespread implementation of taxes, which can make visitors more aware of their existence 
and end up representing a larger proportion of the visitor’s living costs, particularly if staying 
in a relatively small city with lower overall prices. 
Table 5 reports the negative tax elasticities estimated for the sample destinations with more 
than 10,000 summer arrivals in 2017. Since the specification was log-linear in taxes, the 
elasticities are determined by multiplying the estimated coefficient by their 2017 peak tax 
value. Despite the results from the country-level specification, most city-level elasticities are 
not significant at 5% level. In France, Nice and Lyon are the most important destinations 
where accommodation taxes have a negative and significant impact on visitor flows. In Italy 
and Spain, we only found a significant tax elasticity in Naples and Girona, respectively. In all 
these four cases, visitors are tax-inelastic. The negative impact of accommodation taxes on 
economy-class UK arrivals to Naples and Girona can be clearly linked to the low-cost nature 
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of the airlines that dominate the airports (Ryanair and Easyjet) which links well with a profile 
of visitor that is highly sensitive to travel and living costs.  
Nevertheless, the numbers of UK arrivals to the largest taxed destinations in each country 
(Paris, Milan, or Palma de Mallorca) do not seem to be significantly affected by the taxes.  
This agrees with the point made by Sheng and Tsui (2009) about the impact of taxes on 
tourism being dependent on market power. Like the argument above, popular destinations 
with loyal visitors can be expected to experience a less than proportional reduction in visitor 
flows when taxes increase. An alternative explanation from the theory of consumer demand 
could be that city taxes will represent a lower proportion of the visitors’ trip budget when 
traveling to popular destinations, if indeed those budgets are higher than for secondary 
destinations. That reduces price sensitivity for smaller travel expenses. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Our results are particularly relevant for the city of Venice, which, for Summer 2017, has the 
smallest estimated tax elasticity in the sample (-0.002), and, furthermore, it is far from being 
statistically significant. Therefore, tourist taxes are a very effective way to generate income 
for the city, which can be reinvested in preservation initiatives. However, at their current 
level, they are not a strong instrument to rationalize demand, which is the declared objective 
of local authorities. In accordance with that goal, the further increases in accommodation 
taxes that have been implemented since 2017 can be justified to effectively reduce the 
tourism pressure in Venice, particularly if they are raised to a level in which they represent a 
significant proportion of the tourists’ living costs during their stay in the city, so visitors 
become more tax elastic. 
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It is also worth highlighting the lack of a significant tax elasticity in the largest taxed cities in 
the Mediterranean coast: Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca. The non-significant impact of 
city taxes in the Balearic Islands is in direct disagreement with the results from Aguiló et al. 
(2005) and Rosselló and Sansó (2017). However, we defend our conclusion since we have 
more recent data than past studies, in combination with the conclusion from Falk and Hagsten 
(2019) that identified a sharp decrease in tax elasticity of demand between the first and 
second year of implementation. Indeed, after several years, visitors to the Balearics can 
become accustomed to these taxes, to the point in which their impact on demand is 
negligible. The same applies to Barcelona, that is also facing problems with an “excessive” 
level of tourism activity (according to local officials) that results in noise and waste disposal 
problems, as well as episodes of violence against visitor groups. One cannot forget the 
process of gentrification, as long-term residents are pushed away from city-center areas 
where short-term tourist rentals are more lucrative for landlords. In this context, tourism taxes 
may be ineffective to rationalize demand because of the boom of unregulated supply of 
tourism accommodation in recent years (Font-Garolera et al. 2018), which defeats the 
purpose of accommodation taxes in the first place. More stringent controls, including regular 
inspections of city-center properties, as well as strong fines to non-compliant properties, need 
to be implemented by the City Council. 
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5. SUMMARY 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature about the effects of tourism taxation by 
studying the impact of accommodation taxes on outbound travel demand in the United 
Kingdom. To that end, we estimate two demand function specifications (for peak and off-
peak travel) using a dataset of UK airline travelers to Spanish, French, and Italian 
destinations between 2012 and 2018.  
The results from the 2SLS regressions indicate that UK international travelers are more price-
elastic in off-peak periods but still they remain relatively close to unitary elasticity. 
Regarding the impact of accommodation taxes, visitor flows to both France and Spain are 
negatively affected during peak summer periods, yet only French destinations are negatively 
affected during the winter. We link this result to a more widespread implementation of 
accommodation taxes all over the country in combination with lower living costs at smaller 
destinations in France. Despite a much more restricted implementation, the sensitivity of UK 
visitor flows to Spanish destinations is consistent with a reduced level of differentiation in the 
tourism product among Spanish cities, most of which target primarily the sun-and-beach 
segment and thus, they experience a higher degree of substitutability with non-taxed 
destinations. Italian destinations, many of which do not have a such a strong focus in sun-
and-beach tourism, clearly enjoy a higher degree of market power that makes their visitor 
flows more resilient to accommodation taxes. The argument of tax sensitivity due to 
substitutability between destinations in the same country relates to a key aspect of tourism 
taxation, which is the scope of implementation. Indeed, if tourism taxes are set at a municipal 
level, then the local authorities must take into consideration the competition from un-taxed 
destinations in the area, particularly if the focus is on massive sun-and-beach tourism, rather 
than cultural tourism.  If taxes are set at a national level, the different tax elasticities between 
23 
 
primary and secondary cities as well as the elasticity gap between peak and off-peak travel 
justify further differentiation in accommodation tax schemes, which can vary according to the 
category of the city and the period of the year. 
The analysis of tax elasticities at a destination level also reveals the lack of a significant 
effect in major cities, such as Venice, which is at odds with the local authorities’ declared 
objective to rationalize demand. Visitors to Venice are found to be tax-inelastic, which we 
link to the great degree of market power, uniqueness, and visitor loyalty to the destination. 
Thus, the increases in accommodation taxes that have been implemented since 2017 are 
justified to keep generating revenues that can be used for the preservation of the city. The 
lack of a significant impact of tourist taxes in the city of Barcelona suggests that 1) visitors 
have become accustomed to paying these surcharges and 2) the boom of unregulated tourism 
supply in recent years may defeat the purpose of accommodation taxes in the first place. 
More stringent controls, including strong fines, need to be implemented by the City Council.  
The conclusions of this paper, however, must be taken with caution, as our data and method 
present some limitations. First, the limited time-series dimension of our dataset, which does 
not cover pre-implementation periods, coupled with the little variability of taxes over time 
can be a shortcoming. By sacrificing point-of-origin information, our airline data (that 
combine both leisure and business travel) could have been replaced by tourist/visitor data 
from local statistical offices. This is a more specific dependent variable for the effect we aim 
to measure, though not as readily available for the scope of analysis presented here. Finally, 
our dataset only covers scheduled travel but not charter flights, which traditionally serve 
passengers with packaged holidays and are very popular in the UK. The sensitivity of these 
travelers to accommodation taxes may be different due to the lack of information about the 
different cost elements in the trip. Future research can address these issues as the required 
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data become available. Applications of this method to other origin and destination markets 
would also be interesting to expand the body of literature on the effect of accommodation 
taxes on travel demand. 
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Table 1. Top-ten origin and destination cities per country (2017) 
Departing - UK Arriving - France Arriving - Italy Arriving - Spain 
City Pax. City Pax. Tax City Pax. Tax City Pax. Tax 
London 6,986,625 Paris 571,695 1.65 Milan 795,744 4.00 Alicante 1,252,889 0.00 
Manchester 1,514,732 Nice 331,888 1.50 Rome 568,819 4.00 Malaga 1,223,269 0.00 
Birmingham 765,653 Toulouse 228,435 1.65 Venice 378,975 3.50 P. Mallorca 1,041,664 1.00 
Bristol 683,847 Lyon 206,639 1.65 Pisa 228,849 1.50 Barcelona 885,503 0.65 
Edinburgh 654,029 Bordeaux 155,516 1.35 Naples 196,453 2.50 Tenerife 821,554 0.00 
Nottingham 605,980 Marseille 139,052 1.65 Bologna 156,031 2.00 Lanzarote 541,033 0.00 
Glasgow 573,399 Nantes 76,393 1.30 Turin 85,692 2.80 Madrid 517,783 0.00 
Leeds 473,393 Limoges 71,914 0.80 Verona 82,993 1.50 Ibiza 338,870 1.00 
Liverpool 420,907 Bergerac 62,863 1.04 Catania 66,634 1.50 Gran Canaria 317,058 0.00 
Newcastle 412,974 Carcassonne 55,994 1.43 Bari 56,506 0.00 Fuerteventura 278,979 0.00 
TOTAL 13,691,192 TOTAL 2,256,046   TOTAL 2,961,872   TOTAL 8,470,277   
 
Note: Tax refers to the peak tax for 3-star hotels in the summer season. Sources: UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, Official Airline Guide. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the regression variables 
Summer econpaxuk tax3 pnonstop slcc hhi gdppcorigin pricedest jetfuel 
Obs 6,693 6,693 6,693 6,693 6,693 6,693 6,693 6,693 
Mean 6,253 1.01 0.36 0.35 0.71 29,223 21,732 2.06 
Std. Dev. 20,826 1.00 0.46 0.42 0.27 8,313 5,416 0.68 
Min 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 18,700 11,844 1.08 
Max 314,033 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 50,500 46,633 2.96 
       
 
 Winter econpaxuk tax3 pnonstop slcc hhi gdppcorigin pricedest jetfuel 
Obs 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 
Mean 3,861 0.98 0.32 0.32 0.70 29,324 21,850 2.03 
Std. Dev. 15,159 0.99 0.44 0.41 0.27 8,409 5,500 0.68 
Min 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 18,700 12,292 1.08 
Max 278,617 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 50,500 47,184 2.96 
 
Sources: UK Civil Aviation Authority, Official Airline Guide, xe.com, Eurostat, US Energy 
Information Administration. 
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Table 3. Pairwise linear correlation of the regression variables 
  lgdppcorigin lpricedest ljetfuel tax3 pnonstop slcc hhi 
lgdppcorigin 1.000       
lpricedest -0.074 1.000      
ljetfuel -0.092 -0.015 1.000     
tax3 -0.045 0.444 0.031 1.000    
pnonstop 0.153 -0.019 0.012 -0.131 1.000   
slcc 0.090 -0.106 0.035 -0.183 0.686 1.000  
hhi -0.143 0.033 0.000 0.053 -0.048 -0.077 1.000 
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Table 4. 2SLS regression results 
  Summer (peak)   Winter (off-peak) 
Variable Coeff. s.d. t-stat Prob. 
 
Coeff. s.d. t-stat Prob. 
pnonstop 4.004 0.292 13.720 0.000  4.047 0.234 17.320 0.000 
lgdppcorigin 0.528 0.481 1.100 0.272 
 
0.531 0.484 1.100 0.273 
lpricedest -0.955 0.778 -1.230 0.219 -1.105 0.739 -1.490 0.135 
ljetfuel 0.002 0.063 0.030 0.978 
 
-0.011 0.064 -0.180 0.859 
year_2013 -0.166 0.052 -3.170 0.002 
 
-0.266 0.033 -8.130 0.000 
year_2014 -0.157 0.038 -4.160 0.000 
 
-0.295 0.044 -6.650 0.000 
year_2015 0.023 0.073 0.310 0.756 
 
-0.004 0.062 -0.070 0.942 
year_2016 0.245 0.104 2.360 0.018 
 
0.101 0.111 0.910 0.365 
year_2017 0.403 0.155 2.600 0.009 
 
0.269 0.154 1.750 0.080 
tax_France -0.279 0.081 -3.460 0.001 
 
-0.285 0.076 -3.770 0.000 
tax_Italy -0.019 0.025 -0.770 0.440 
 
-0.004 0.022 -0.190 0.850 
tax_Spain -0.128 0.055 -2.350 0.019 
 
0.033 0.058 0.580 0.564 
constant 7.772 9.194 0.850 0.398   9.023 8.798 1.030 0.305 
 
Obs 6,693 R-sq 0.686 
 
Obs 6,378 R-sq 0.643 
  Wald chi2 460.4 Prob 0.000   Wald chi2 592.6 Prob 0.000 
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Table 5. Estimated tax elasticities for major destinations (Summer 2017) 
Country City coeff. s.d. t-stat prob. elasticity passengers tax 
France Paris -0.113 0.119 -0.950 0.342 -0.068 292,607 1.65 
France Nice -0.311 0.148 -2.100 0.036 -0.207 221,362 1.50 
France Bordeaux -0.151 0.202 -0.750 0.454 -0.112 99,095 1.35 
France Lyon -0.292 0.152 -1.930 0.054 -0.177 89,789 1.65 
France Marseille -0.325 0.203 -1.600 0.109 -0.197 84,402 1.65 
France Bergerac -0.240 0.465 -0.510 0.607 -0.230 47,056 1.04 
France Nantes -0.104 0.231 -0.450 0.653 -0.080 44,468 1.30 
France Carcassonne -0.220 0.150 -1.460 0.143 -0.154 38,023 1.43 
France Biarritz -0.450 0.389 -1.160 0.248 -0.349 30,724 1.29 
France Beziers -0.122 0.318 -0.380 0.702 -0.090 28,874 1.35 
France St-Malo -0.892 0.396 -2.250 0.024 -0.892 23,926 1.00 
France La Rochelle -0.313 0.218 -1.440 0.151 -0.190 23,702 1.65 
France Nimes -1.042 0.442 -2.360 0.018 -1.042 19,453 1.00 
Italy Milan -0.063 0.155 -0.410 0.685 -0.016 427,797 4.00 
Italy Rome -0.037 0.048 -0.760 0.448 -0.009 320,515 4.00 
Italy Venice -0.008 0.030 -0.280 0.778 -0.002 220,856 3.50 
Italy Naples -0.560 0.253 -2.210 0.027 -0.224 138,150 2.50 
Italy Bologna -0.056 0.062 -0.910 0.365 -0.028 85,950 2.00 
Spain P. Mallorca -0.147 0.103 -1.420 0.155 -0.147 844,856 1.00 
Spain Barcelona -0.012 0.083 -0.140 0.890 -0.018 522,531 0.65 
Spain Ibiza -0.184 0.113 -1.620 0.104 -0.184 301,057 1.00 
Spain Menorca -0.041 0.059 -0.690 0.487 -0.041 169,012 1.00 
Spain Girona -0.467 0.165 -2.840 0.005 -0.719 119,732 0.65 
Spain Reus -0.180 0.127 -1.420 0.155 -0.277 99,242 0.65 
 
Note: Bold indicates that the coefficient is significant at 95 per cent level. 
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Figure 1. Origin and destination cities in the sample 
Sources: UK Civil Aviation Authority, Official Airline Guide. 
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Figure 2. Annual change in UK outbound air travel, GBP/EUR exchange rate, and GDP per 
capita 2013-2017 
Sources: UK Civil Aviation Authority, xe.com, Eurostat 
